EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-THE PSYCHOTHERAPISTPATIENT PRIVILEGE AS ADOPTED IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
INCLUDES NOT ONLY ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO LICENSED
ALL
ALSO
BUT
PSYCHOLOGISTS,
AND
PSYCHIATRISTS
COMMUNICATIONS TO LICENSED SOCIAL WORKERS IN THE COURSE

oF PSYCHOTHERAPY-Jaffee

v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).

Privilege law began as a judicially created doctrine recognizing
honor between lawyers in England not to divulge confidential communications.' At common law, testimonial privileges were discouraged, 2 but
1 See Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 413 (Alaska 1976).

Privilege is defined as "[a]

particular and peculiar benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person, company, or class, beyond the common advantages of other citizens. An exceptional or extraordinary power
or exemption." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (6th ed. 1990). "Privilege" is a derivative form of the Latin phrase "privata lex," which can be loosely translated as "a prerogative given to a person or group of persons." Brian Domb, I Shot the Sheriff, But
Only My Analyst Knows: Shrinking the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 5 J.L. &
HEALTH 209, 211 (1991) (footnote omitted).
Two types of privileges exist: testimonial and viatorial. See 8 JoHN HENRY
WIOMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2197, at 113-14 (McNanghton rev.

1961). Testimonial privileges prevent divulgence of evidence due to the topic or communication that it affects. See 8 id. at 114. If a communication is privileged, it will be
regarded as a testimonial privilege based on the confidential relationship in which it transpired. See 8 id. Viatorial privileges, on the other hand, excuse evidence because they
absolve a witness from being present at trial. See 8 id.at 113. A viatorial privilege will
exclude a witness from traveling and being present at trial so long as that witness has not
received notice from the court that his or her testimony was required, and the court did
not compensate the witness, or previously excuse him or her for an inability to attend.
See 8 id. at 113-14.
2 See 8 WIGMoRE, supra note 1, § 2190, at 67-68 (describing die common law
"recognition of a definite testimonial compulsion and duty" for witnesses in common law
courts). le common law standards underlying the identification of new testimonial
privileges can be stated as:
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental
maxim that the public.., has a right to every man's evidence .... [W]e
start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what
testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions which may
exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive
general rule.
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (footnote omitted). The phrase "every
man's evidence" is well known, and both courts and scholars have invoked the phrase
since the mid-eighteenth century. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 n.8
(1996). For example, both Lord Chancellor Hardwicke and the Duke of Argyll cited the
maxim during a May 25, 1742 debate in the House of Lords about a proposal to confer
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were extended without controversy to protect communications between
the husband and wife, and the attorney and client.4 This expansion of
common law privileges ceased, however, more than a century ago. 5
Privileges were viewed as a hindrance to the primary responsibility of a
court; namely, to find the truth. 6 Although the common law has not recimmunity upon a witness for testifying against Sir Robert Walpole, the first Earl of Orford. See id.
3 See Domb, supra note 1, at 214-15. Black's Law Dictionary attempts
to define the
husband-wife privilege as
[a] privilege extended to confidential marital communications. While state
statutes vary, in general such provide that a spouse has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent the other from disclosing, a confidential
communication made while spouses were married. There are certain exceptions to this privilege, the major one being where one spouse is the victim of a crime by the other.
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 741-42 (6th ed. 1990). Both scholars and courts have stated
that a perceived justification for this privilege is that it is likely to advance harmony and
sanctity in the marriage association. See, e.g., Domb, supra note 1, at 215; Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
This testimonial privilege is broader than most in that it applies not only to confidential communications, but to any detrimental testimony. See Domb, supra note 1, at 215.
The potential abuse of this broadness (for example, marrying someone during a trial so as
to not have to testify against that person) is one possible reason for the recent narrowing
of the privilege's scope. See id.
4 See 8 WIGMOmtE, supra note 1, § 2290, at 542 (stating that the
attorney-client
privilege is the oldest privilege for confidential communications known to the common
law). Black's Law Dictionary defines the privilege as the
client's privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from

disclosing confidential communications between him and his attorney. Such
privilege protects communications between attorney and client made for
[the] purpose of furnishing or obtaining professional legal advice or assistance.

BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 129 (6th ed. 1990). Its aim is to promote complete and honest
communication between clients and their attorneys, and thus encourage more wide-spread
public interests in the awareness of law and facilitation of justice. See Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). It is widely acknowledged that for an attorney
to function effectively, open communication is required. See Ellen S. Soffin, The Case
for a FederalPsychotherapist-PatientPrivilege that Protects PatientIdentity, 1985 DUKE
LJ. 1217, 1240 (1985). Once this premise is accepted, it logically flows that a client will
come forward with more information if he or she is assured that the confidentiality of this
information is protected through the attorney-client privilege. See id.
5 See CHARiE MCCORMICK, MCCoRMICK ON EvIDENCE § 75, at 107 (John
William
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). Although McCormick recognized the difficulty in imputing a
specific reason for this termination, he nonetheless found that a contributing element was
clearly the tendency of the judiciary to view privileges as an impediment to litigation. See
id. 6
See Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S.
345, 360 (1982) (finding that a statute
recognizing a privilege should be strictly construed to avoid suppressing what would otherwise
be competent evidence); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (holding that
testimonial privileges "are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in
derogation for the search for truth" (footnote omitted)); ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336,
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ognized the physician-patient privilege, legislatures in a number of states
have adopted this privilege through statute. 7 Similarly, states have
widely recognized the priest-penitent privilege.8
Today, state privilege law is largely a product of statutes for those
privileges not recognized at common law. 9 The overwhelming majority
1344 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasizing that privileges are "strongly disfavored" among the
federal courts).
Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, outlined four conditions that must be present
before any privilege can be established:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.
8 WIOMOCRE, supra note 1, § 2285, at 527 (footnote omitted). For an application of Wigmore's four conditions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, see infra note 21.
7 See Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1450, 1532 (1985) [hereinafter Developments]. The physician-patient privilege is defined
as "f[the right of one who is a patient to refuse to divulge, or have divulged by his phyBLAcK's LAW
sician, the communications made between he and his physician."
DICTIONARY 1126 (6th ed. 1990). This privilege is statutorily recognized in most states
and applies only to the patient. See id. at 1126-27. It may also be waived by the patient.
See id. at 1127.

The privilege was created during the nineteenth century largely as a tool for encouraging citizens to seek medical treatment, thereby improving public health. See Developments, supra, at 1532. The idea was that citizens would not seek treatment for certain
diseases if they thought it would become public information that they had a specific disease. See id. The privilege was further intended to invite patients to fully disclose necessary information, which would in turn aid in the adequacy of the treatment. See id. at
1532-33. The very first physician-patient privilege was enacted by the New York Legislature in 1828. See McCoRMIcK, supra note 5, § 75, at 107.
The physician-patient privilege has yet to be recognized by the federal courts in
cases dealing with a federal question. See United States v. University Hosp., 575 F.
Supp. 607, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding that the physician-patient privilege does not
exist in federal court proceedings except when it pertains to a claim or defense where
state law applies).
8 See Jacob M. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-PenitentPrivilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 95, 109, 113 (1983). The priest-penitent privilege is defined as "the recognition of the seal of confession which bars testimony as to the contents
of a communication from one to his confessor." BLAcK's LAw DIcTIONARY 1189 (6th ed.
1990). It is recognized in all states, and nearly all states have statutes specifically providing for the privilege. See id.; Yellin, supra, at 109.
The priest-penitent privilege is a product of our society's zeal to protect relationships
founded on confidence and trust, as well as the perception that requiring a priest to testify
is an ineffective method of producing testimony. See id. at 111. It is generally considered an offensive concept to jail a member of the clergy for his or her devotion to and
compliance with an absolute religious duty that he or she is compelled to adhere to. See
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of new privileges created at the state level since the early 1800s have
been enacted legislatively. 10 This trend toward codification has even led
to the preexisting common law privileges, such as the attorney-client11and
husband-wife privileges, being statutorily regulated in several states.
Federal law dealing with privileges has evolved in a somewhat different fashion. Today, the recognition of new privileges is governed by
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which directs courts to recognize privileges according to the principles of common law, limited only by experience and reason.13 Congress established the Federal Rules of Evidence
9 See McCoRmcK, supra note 5, § 75, at 107; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2286, at
532. A variety of different interest groups have attempted to influence die recognition of
new privileges, all believing that a particular interest is essential and warranted. See id.
As a result of the judicial attitude that privileges were a hindrance to litigation, the responsibility for the creation of new privileges shifted dramatically from the courts to legislatures during the nineteenth century. See MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 75, at 107.
10 See MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 75, at 107. McCormick noted that while
many
of the statutory privileges are undoubtedly sound in their reasoning, legislatumr are occasionally swayed by dominant groups who seek the prominence and convenience of a
"professionally based privilege." See id. The result of this procedure is that states differ
considerably in whether they recognize a particular privilege, as well as how that privilege is limited or defined. See id.
State legislatures have enacted a variety of different privileges. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2286, at 532-35. These include statutes that recognize a privilege for certain tips given to journalists by their sources; communications to accountants; and conversations with psychologists. See 8 id. at 532-33. Iowa has even recognized a privilege
for statements made to "confidential clerks or stenographers." See 8 id. at 535 n.24
("No... stenographer or confidential clerk of any [attorney or physician], who obtains
such information by reason of his employment... shall be allowed, in giving testimony,
to disclose any confidential communication properly entrusted to him in his professional

capacity."(alteration in original)).

11 See MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 75, at 107. According to Wigiore, state statutes
that erect testimonial privileges should be clearly distinguished from those that do no
more than punish for general violations of a confidential relationship. See 8 WIuMoIR,
supra note 1, § 2286, at 532. Those state statutes that only penalize for a breach of confidence, such as those dealing with disclosure by a detective or a trust company, expressly sanction disclosure in judicial proceedings. See 8 id. Testimonial privileges,
however, do not. See 8 id.
12 See MCCoRMIcK, supra note 5, § 75, at 107-08.
13 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. CL 1923, 1927 (1996). Rule 501 states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as
to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FE). R. EviD. 501. Under Rule 501, privileges in diversity actions will continue to derive from state privilege law. See MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 76.1, at 108. Only in
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with the intention that a broad national rule would bring clarification,
simplification, and uniformity to an otherwise unstable area of the law. 14
This "broad national rule," however, applies only to claims based on a
federal question."1 In any case where the evidence relates to a claim or
defense governed by state substantive law, the state law on privileges will
be applied. 16
Because Congress did not specifically delineate certain privileges
when it enacted Rule 501,17 any prospect of concrete national uniformity

federal question cases and criminal actions will privileges be governed by the common
law as defined in view of "reason and experience." See id.
14 See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and FederalRule of Evidence 501: Privilege
and Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GBo. L.J. 1781, 1783 (1994). Congress adopted the
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.
See CHmSTOPHER B. MuELE & LAiRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RUiE: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS xxix (3d ed.
1996); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 76.1, at 108 (discussing the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence). Tis was after Congress rejected the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence drafted by the Advisory Committee and approved by the Supreme
Court in 1972. See id. § 75, at 107. The Proposed Federal Rules contained provisions
explicitly recognizing nine privileges: (1) required reports; (2) attorney-client; (3) psychotherapist-patient; (4) husband-wife; (5) priest-penitent; (6) political vote; (7) trade secrets; (8) secrets of state and other official information; and (9) identity of informer. See
id. When these rules were submitted to Congress, they created great controversy, and as
a result, Congress adopted what is now Federal Rule of Evidence 501. See id.
The enactment of the Proposed Federal Rules would have constructed a unitary system of privilege applying to every case, "regardless of jurisdictional ground." See id. §
76.1, at 108. The act passed by Congress, however, instituted a bifurcated system for
privilege law. See id.; FED. R. EviD. 501.
In enacting Rule 501, Congress did not intend that the law of privileges be frozen in
time. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980). The rule provided the federal courts with a mandate to carry forward the natural development process of testimonial privileges. See id. The Proposed Rules would have completely abrogated preexisting law of privilege and would have recognized only nine distinct categories of
privileged communications.
See Proposed Rules 502-510, 56 F.R.D. 183, 234-58
(1973). Congress rejected this static approach, however, instead adopting Rule 501,
which allowed courts the flexibility to adopt new privileges "on a case-by-case basis,"
regardless of whether the prospective privilege fit into a specifically delineated category.
See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47.
15 See FED. R. EVID. 501; see also Dudley, supra note
14, at 1783 (noting that no
provision allows for the utilization of state law in civil cases based on federal law, or in

federal criminal cases).

See FED. R. EVID. 501. The rule is a product of an awkward trade-off
between the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
sought both to federalize and to codify all of the law of privilege to be applied in federal courts, and those who argued that most privileges were
creatures of state law and that federal codification would freeze the development of a necessarily dynamic area of the law.
Dudley, supra note 14, at 1784 (footnotes omitted).
17 See FED. R. EVID. 501. For a discussion on the adoption of
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, see supra note 14.
16
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for privilege law was effectively precluded. 18 Congress merely instructed

the courts of the United States that privileges should be recognized "in
the light of reason and experience." 19 As a result, the kaleidoscopic
federal court systems will likely
pattern of privilege in both the state and 20
remain intact for the ascertainable future.
The psychotherapist-patient privilege' provides a clear example of
this kaleidoscopic pattern of privilege in both the state and federal court
is See MCCoRMICK, supra note 5, § 76, at 108.

States deviate substantially in rec-

ognizing privileges. See id.§ 76.2, at 109. All states have at least some form (although
varied) of both the husband-wife and the attorney-client privilege. See id. In addition,
most provide for the protection of at least some types of government information. See id.
Most states also have one version or another of both a physician-patient and priestpenitent privilege. See id.
Federal privilege law, on the other hand, does not recognize the physician-patient
privilege. See United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 611 (E.D.N.Y.
1983). Some states, and even some lower federal courts, have also recognized a limited
journalist-source privilege. See MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 76.2, at 110. Communications by a client to an accountant are also recognized in roughly a third of the states. See
id. There is also even an occasional privilege recognized in states for disclosures to
school counselors and teachers, nurses, private investigators, social workers, marriage
counselors, group-psychotherapy participants, and confidential stenographers and clerks.
See id.
19 FED. R. EVID. 501. The Rule's authors borrowed this phrase from
the opinion of
the United States Supreme Court in Wolfle v. United States, which stated that:
the rules governing the competence of witnesses in criminal trials in the
federal courts are not necessarily restricted to those local rules in force at
the time of the admission into the Union of the particular state where the
trial takes place, but are governed by common law principles as interpreted
and applied by the federal courts in the light of reason and experience.
291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has also stated that "the
common law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to
varng conditions." Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933).
See MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 76, at 108.
21 See Domb, supra note 1, at 221 (noting that the foundation of the psychotherapistpatient privilege lies in the encouragement of complete communication between a therapist and patient, as well as the preservation of a relationship of assurance and confidence
between the two). It has been said that the privilege was "derive[d] from the Freudian
model of psychoanalysis" that required both complete disclosure and the confidence of
the patient for adequate treatment. See Robert S. Catz & Jill J.Lange, JudicialPrivilege,
22 GA. L. REV. 89, 106 (1987).
A frequently quoted statement regarding the policy behind the psychotherapistpatient privilege is:
The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the world.
He exposes to the therapist not only what his words directly express; he
lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his shame.
Most patients who undergo psychotherapy know that this is what will be
expected of them, and that they cannot get help except on that condition.... It would be too much to expect them to do so if they knew that
all they say-and all that the psychiatrist learns from what they say-may
be revealed to the whole world from a witness stand.
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systems. 22 Although all fifty states, as well as the District of Columbia,
have recognized this privilege, 23 this recognition has come in many
M
MIPM
S. GUTMACHER & HmRY WEIHOFWN, PSYcHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952).
The central argument for the privilege is that unless the patient is certain that the psychotherapist will have no control over him, especially through means like testifying in a
courtroom, a patient will not overcome the "built-in resistance to full disclosure." Domb,
supra note 1, at 220 n.89.
le common law did not recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See Developments, supra note 7, at 1539. Unlike the physician-patient privilege, however,
courts and academics have consistently endorsed the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
See id. The privilege itself solely protects confidential communications. See id.at 1540.
These communications encompass any and all information procured by the psychotherapist during therapy, either orally or through observance of the patient. See id. The
privilege, however, protects only those communications essential for treatment. See id. at
1540-41. Accordingly, disclosures that are not communicated for the purposes of treatment, such as those made in the course of a court-ordered examination to ascertain a
criminal defendant's mental state, are not privileged. See id. at 1541.
The psychotherapist-patient privilege satisfies Wigmore's four criteria for establishing a privilege at common law. See Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 417 (Alaska 1976).
First, the communications between a psychotherapist and his patient are "inherently confidential."
See id. Second, this confidential relationship is a necessary element to
achieving the goal of psychotherapy. See id. Third, the psychotherapist-patient relationship is clealy one that the community believes should be fostered. See id. Lastly, "in
balancing injury to the relation, by fear of disclosure, against the benefit to justice by
compelling disclosure, the scales weigh heavily in favor of confidentiality." Id. at 418.
For an outline of Wigmore's four criteria for establishing privileges, see supra note 6.
22 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1939 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scala referred to "the enormous degree of disagreement among the States as to the
scope of the privilege." Id. The Justice further commented on the disparity between
states in terms of applying the privilege to social workers:
In adopting any sort of social worker privilege, then, the Court can at most
claim that it is following the legislative "experience" of 40 States, and
contradicting the "experience" of 10. But turning to those States that do
have an appreciable privilege of some sort, the diversity is vast. In Illinois
and Wisconsin, the social-worker privilege does not apply when the confidential information pertains to homicide, and in the District of Columbia
when it pertains to any crime "inflicting injuries" upon persons. In Missouri, the privilege is suspended as to information that pertains to a criminal act, and in Texas when the information is sought in any criminal prosecution.
In Kansas and Oklahoma, the privilege yields when the
information pertains to "violations of any law" . ...
In Oregon, a stateemployed social worker like Karen Beyer loses the privilege where her supervisor determines that her testimony "is necessary in the performance of
the duty of the social worker as a public employee." In South Carolina, a
social worker is forced to disclose confidences "when required by statutory
law or by court order for good cause shown to the extent that the patient's
care and treatment or the nature and extent of his mental illness or emotional condition are reasonably at issue in a proceeding." The majority of
social-worker-privilege States declare the privilege inapplicable to information relating to child abuse. And the States that do not fall into any of
the above categories provide exceptions for commitment proceedings, for
proceedings in which the patient relies on his mental or emotional condition
as an element of his claim or defense, or for communications made in the
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varying forms.2 In addition, prior to 1996, the privilege was not uniformly recognized in the federal courts. 25
course of a court-ordered examination of the mental or emotional condition

of the patient.
Id. at 1939-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). For a discussion on Justice Scalia's dissent in Jaffee, see infra notes 142-65 and accompanying
text.
23 See ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (1991); ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.86.180, 08.86.200 (Michie
1996); Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2085 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); ARK. RULE EVID.
503; CAL. EVlID. CODE 3§ 1010, 1012, 1014 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1390-107(g) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146c (West 1991 &
Supp. 1996); DI_ UNIP. RULE EVID. 503; D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307 (1995); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 90.503 (West 1979 & Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21 (1995);
HAW. RULES EvID. 504, 504.1; IDAHO RULE EViD. 503; 225 IL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/5
(West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-33-1-17 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 622.10 (West 1950 & Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5323 (1992); KY.
RULE EVID. 507; LA. CODE EVl/D. ANN. art. 510 (West 1995); ME. RULE EVID. 503; MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. Pioc. §§ 9-109, 9-109.1 (1995 & Supp. 1996); MASS. GIN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); MIcH. Cowm. LAws ANN. §
333.18237 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1988 & Supp.
1997); MIss. RULE EvID. 503; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060 (West 1996); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 26-1-807 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1995); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §
49.209 (Michie 1996); N.H. RULE EVlID. 503; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 45:14B-28 (West
1995); N.M. RULE Evin. 11-504; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4507 (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-53.3 (Supp. 1996); N.D. RULE EvID. 503; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02
(Anderson 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 2503 (West 1993); OR. RULES EvlD. 504,
504-1; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5944 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAws §§
5-37.3-3, 5-37.3-4 (1995 & Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95 (Law Co-op.
Supp. 1996); S.D. CODMD LAWS 3§ 19-13-6 to 19-13-11 (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 24-1-207 (1980 & Supp. 1996); TEX. RULES CwY. EVID. 509, 510; UTAH RULE
EVID. 506; VT. RULE EVID. 503; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400.2 (Michie 1992); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 18.83.110 (West 1989); W. VA. CODE § 27-3-1 (1992); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 905.04 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-27-123 (Michie Supp.
1996).
See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1940 (Scalia, J., dissenting). A limited number of states
protect communications with only psychiatrists and psychologists, but most implement the
protection on a broader scale. See id. at 1930 n.13. For example, the Hawaii Rules of
Evidence and the North Dakota Rules of Evidence extend the privilege to both physicians
and psychotherapists, whereas Arizona's Rules cover "behavioral health professionals."
See HAw. RULES EVID. 504, 504.1; N.D. RULE EVID. 503; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 323283 (WEST 1992). In Texas, the privilege has been extended to all people "licensed or
certified by the State of Texas in the diagnosis, evaluation or treatment of any mental or
emotional disorder" or "involved in the treatment or examination of drug abusers." Tc.
RULES Crv. EvID. 510(a)(1). Utah law goes even further, extending the privilege to all
confidential communications made to marriage and family therapists; professional counselors; "advanced practice registered nurse[s] designated as registered psychiatric mental
health nurse specialist[s]"; and clinical or certified social workers. See UTAH RULE EVID.
506. The extent of the exceptions to the privilege adopted by the states is correspondingl varied. See Jaffee, 116 S. CL at 1930 n.13.
See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee, the
United States Courts of Appeals were in disagreement over whether a psychotherapistpatient privilege qualified for recognition under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. See id.;
see aLso United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 1993) (not recognizing
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In a recent case, Jaffee v. Redmond, 26 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issues of whether the federal courts should recognize
the psychotherapist-patient privilege under Rule 501 ,27 and whether that
privilege should extend to all licensed social workers.
In finding a need
to insulate communications conveyed to licensed psychologists and psychiatrists, the Court held that these communications are protected under
Rule 501.29 Furthermore, the Court held that the psychotherapist-patient
privilege extends to communications made to "licensed social workers in
the course of psychotherapy. "3
On June 27, 1991, Police Officer Mary Lu Redmond responded to a
call at an apartment complex where a fight was in progress. 3 1 Having
exited her patrol car, Redmond witnessed several men rushing out of the
apartment building.
One of these men, Ricky Allen, was chasing another man with a butcher's knife.33 After Allen disregarded Redmond's
repeated orders to drop the knife, Redmond was forced to shoot Allen,
believing that Allen was about to wound the man he was pursuing.34

Allen died as a result of this single gunshot.35
privilege); In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing privilege); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1988) (not recognizing privilege);
United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 1988) (same); In re Zuniga, 714
F.2d 632, 639 (6th Cir. 1983) (recognizing privilege); United States v. Meagher, 531
F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir. 1975) (not recognizing privilege).
26 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
27 See id.at 1927. The Court acknowledged that there was
a conflict among the
courts of appeals on whether such a privilege should be recognized. See id. For the full
delineation of the split between the courts, see supra note 25. For the full text of Federal
Rule of Evidence 501, see supra note 13.
28 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at
1931.
29 Seeid.
30 See id. The Court agreed with the decision of the
Seventh Circuit, which stated
that "'[dlrawing a distinction between the counseling provided by costly psychotherapists
and the counseling provided by more readily accessible social workers serves no discernible public purpose.'" Id. at 1931-32 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346,
1358 n.19 (7th Cir. 1995), af'd, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996)).
31 See id.at 1925. Redmond was the first police officer on the scene. See id. She
was employed as a police officer by the Village of Hoffman Estates, a suburb of Chicago,
Illinois. See id. After the events at issue in this lawsuit arose, Redmond left the Hoffman
Estates Police Department. See id.n.1.
32 See id. As Redmond initially arrived at the scene, two women ran toward the
officer's squad car, screaming and waiving their arms, declaring that a stabbing had taken
place in the building. See id. Redmond communicated this information to her dispatcher,
and requested an ambulance to the scene. See id. Redmond next exited the patrol car
and began walking toward the apartment building, when several men burst out, one of
whom was brandishing a pipe. See id. These men ignored Redmond's orders to fall to
the ground, so she drew her revolver. See id. It was at this point that Ricky Allen exited
theapartment building, chasing another man with a butcher's knife. See id.
See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1925.
See id.at 1925-26. Redmond subsequently recalled the situation:
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After the incident, Redmond received counseling services from
Karen Beyer, a clinically licensed social worker. 36 Their sessions began
three or four days after the shooting and continued at the rate of
37 apmonths.
six
next
the
for
week
per
sessions
three
or
two
proximately
The administrator of the estate of Ricky Allen subsequently brought
suit against Redmond, alleging that she had violated the decedent's constitutional rights by imposing excessive force during the shooting incident. 38 During the pretrial discovery process, the plaintiff learned of the
I ordered the black male subject with the knife to drop the knife several
times. I told him to drop the knife and get on the ground.... I was yelling at him to drop the knife and get on the ground.... [Hie did not drop
the knife and he did not get on the ground....
[I yelled] at least three
times. I just kept yelling the minute I saw him.
Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1349 (alteration in original). Redmond further recalled the instant be-

fore the gunshot:
As [Allen] was gaining speed on the first subject until they were directly--he was directly in front of him, like the first subject's back, and
then the second subject, as he was gaining on him the second subject, the
male black subject with the knife took the knife back, raised it above his
head and I waited, and as he started to come down with the knife and made
the downward motion, I fired one shot at him.
Id.

35 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926. Redmond testified that after taking a lone
shot at
Allen, he collapsed directly to the ground. See Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1349. With her service
revolver at her side, Redmond immediately ran to him. See id. Redmond recalled observing the butcher knife laying about two or three feet away from Allen's body. See id.
Officer Joe Graham, who pulled in at the scene after the incident had already occurred, stated that when he arrived, Redmond was standing on the lawn behind Allen's
body aiming her gun at the crowd. See id. at 1349-50. According to Graham, she appeared "'somewhat bewildered," later explaining that she was "'visibly shaken or upset
or disoriented.'" Id. at 1350. Graham further recalled that the crowd was "'fluctuating
back and forth ... in a very chaotic movement,'" and the people were yelling that "'they
were going to sue the white bitch for shooting Mr. Allen.'" Id.
See Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1350. According to Illinois law, a clinically licensed social
worker is a provider of "mental health services for the evaluation, treatment, and prevention of mental and emotional disorders... based on knowledge and theory of psychosocial development, behavior, psychopathology, unconscious motivation, interpersonal relationships, and environmental stress." Id. n.3 (quoting 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/3
(West 1994)). In Illinois, a licensed clinical social worker
(1) has a master's or doctoral degree in social work from an accredited
graduate school of social work and (2) has at least three years of supervised postmaster's clinical social work practice which shall include the
provision of mental health services for the evaluation, treatment, and prevention of mental and emotional disorders.
Id. (_quoting 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-122.1 (West 1994)).
37 See id. at 1350. The only conversations that took place between Redmond and
Karen Beyer during this time period were during counseling sessions. See id. n.4.
38 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926. The complaint sought damages under the minois
Wrongful Death Act as well as under Title 42 of the United States Code. See id.; see
also 740 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-180/2.2 (West 1993) (allowing a private cause of
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sessions between Redmond and Beyer,39 and immediately attempted to
discover Beyer's notes of the sessions for use in Redmond's crossexamination. 40 The plaintiff thereafter served Beyer with a subpoena to
produce proof of being a professional counselor, to produce all of her records and notes concerning Redmond, and to testify at a deposition. 41
Beyer appeared for the deposition, but specifically limited her answers to those statements made by Redmond about the facts leading up to
the fatal incident on June 27, 1991. 42 Although at trial the judge allowed
both Redmond and Beyer to testify, 43 he instructed the jury that it would
be allowed to draw an adverse inference out of both Redmond's and
Beyer's denial to produce Beyer's notes and testify about their communications. 44 Based on this instruction, the jury found for
45 the plaintiff on
both claims, awarding a total of $545,000 in damages.
action for damages for wrongful death); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (allowing a federal civil
action for deprivation of civil rights).
39 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926. The administrator of Allen's estate
learned specifically that Redmond had conducted approximately fifty counseling sessions with Beyer.
See id.
40 See id. At the deposition of Redmond, the plaintiffs asked about
the subject of
these sessions with Beyer. See Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1350. Redmond refused to answer
these questions, however, claiming that these communications were with a "licensed
clinical social worker," and were therefore privileged. See id.
41 See Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1350.
42 See id. at 1351. Beyer also adamantly refused to furnish her notes or reports
dealing with her therapy sessions with Redmond. See id. Despite the trial judge's order
to compel the requested evidence, Beyer continually refused to disclose her communications with Redmond, except to provide a specific factual description of the pattern of
events as they led to the shooting. See id. Claiming privilege, Beyer also produced only
three pages of notes-which were redacted. See id. In addition, Redmond, in her second
and third deposition sessions, continually answered "I don't recall" to questions dealing
with her counseling sessions with Beyer. See id.
43 See id. On April 6, 1993, the trial judge ordered that Redmond would
not be allowed to testify about her version of the incident, reasoning that attorneys for the plaintiff
would be unable to cross-examine Redmond effectively. See id. The judge vacated this
order just prior to trial, however, but made his intention clear that the jury would be
permitted to draw an adverse presumption based on these actions of Beyer and Redmond.
See id.
See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926. Jury Instruction Number Eight stated in its entirety:
You have heard evidence in this case that Karen Beyer, while an employee
of the Village of Hoffman Estates, had numerous conversations with Mary
Lu Redmond and made notes of those conversations. You have also heard
testimony that Ms. Beyer's notes were the property of the Village of Hoffman Estates. During the course of this lawsuit the Court ordered the Village of Hoffman Estates to turn over all of Ms. Beyer's notes to plaintiffs
attorneys. The Village was provided with numerous opportunities to obey
the Court's order and refused to do so. During the course of this lawsuit
Mary Lu Redmond also testified that she would not authorize or direct Ms.
Beyer to turn over those notes to plaintiffs attorneys. During Ms. Beyer's
testimony she referred to herself as a "therapist," although she is not a
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Redmond appealed the district court's decision to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 46 The Seventh Circuit reversed
the decision, and remanded for a new trial. 47 Recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege under the touchstones of "reason and experience," 48 the court noted that all fifty states have adopted at least some

form of the privilege. 49 Inaddition, the court was further influenced by
the fact that Illinois law categorically extended its form of the privilege to
social workers in the position of Karen Beyer. 50 The court of appeals
qualified its recognition of this new privilege, however, declaring that the
privilege could not be asserted when the subject matter5 1of a patient's consultation outweighs the privacy interest of that patient.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari52 to settle the
disputed issue among the circuits53 of whether communications between a
psychotherapist and a patient are protected under Rule 501.5 The Supreme Court held that not only should the privilege be recognized, but it

psychiatrist or psychologist - she is a social worker. This Court has ruled
that there is no legal justification in this lawsuit, based as it is on a federal
constitutional claim, to refuse to produce Ms. Beyer's notes of her conversations with Mary Lu Redmond, and that such refusal was unjustified.
Under these circumstances, you are entitled to presume that the contents of
the notes would be unfavorable to Mary Lu Redmond and the Village of

Hoffman Estates.
Jaff e, 51 F.3d at 1351-52 n.9 (emphasis removed).
See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926. The jury awarded plaintiff $45,000 in damages
for
the federal constitutional claim, as well as $500,000 for the wrongful death claim based
on state law. See id.
46 See Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1352.
47 See id. at 1348. Redmond also appealed the district court's use
of a "deadly
force" jury instruction. See id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district judge's decision
concerning this issue and the Supreme Court did not review it. See id.; Jaffee, 116 S. Ct.
at 1925.
4 Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1355-56. The court agreed with both the Second and
the Sixth
Circuits that acknowledgment of the psychotherapist-patient privilege was necessitated by
both experience and reason. See id. The court further explained that a patient shares a
unique relationship with his or her psychotherapist, and it stands to reason that the most
important aspect of gaining successful treatment is the patient's capacity to interchange
fre
without concern of public dissemination. See id.
See id. at 1356.
5D See id. at 1357.
51 See id.
52 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 334 (1995).
See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1927 (1996). For a list of those circuit
courts recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege as well as those declining to recognze it, see supra note 25.
See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927. For the full text of Federal Rule of Evidence
501,
see supra note 13.
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should include communications to all "licensed social workers in the
course of psychotherapy." 5 5
A split in the courts of appeals over whether to recognize a federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege provided the framework for the decision
in Jaee.s6 In 1992, the Second Circuit was faced with the issue in In re
Doe.
In Doe, the court heard an appeal from a lower court order
holding the appellant, John Doe, in contempt for refusing to disclose
certain answers regarding his psychiatric history. 58 The district court refused to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege and compelled Doe
to disclose his full psychiatric history to the defendant.5 9
On appeal in Doe, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's
decision, recognizing that the intent of Congress in enactinj Rule 501
was not to suspend the development of federal privilege law.
The court
recognized the privilege, noting that there were several important interests at stake, including the appellant's personal privacy and the necessity
See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931.
See id. at 1927.
964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992).
See id. at 1326. A man named Steven Diamond was indicted in 1990 for attempted
extortion, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988). See id. The appellant, a key witness
in Doe, had initiated a federal investigation of Diamond, alleging that Diamond attempted
to extort roughly $50,000 from Doe for Diamond's services in obtaining a zoning variance for a theater owned by Doe. See id. The government's case against Diamond
rested largely on the testimony of Doe, and Diamond therefore attempted to raise the issue of Doe's credibility in his own defense. See id.
Counsel for Diamond subsequently learned that Doe had suffered from periodic depression over the course of 30 years during which time he had consulted various psychiatrists. See id. The defendants sought to interview the psychiatrists, as well as obtain a
release of Doe's files, to evaluate the information in preparation of trial. See id. at 132627. Doe refused to disclose this information, claiming that "'it
would be unfair, confusing, and prejudicial to permit defense counsel to go into the content of these confidential
records.'" Id. at 1327.
The trial judge initially issued a protective order for the restricted purpose of enabling defense counsel to distinguish the information it would use at trial. See id. Defense
counsel retained a psychiatrist to review the records who stated to the court that:
"'[Appellant's] long history of emotional illness is certainly relevant to his credibility as a
witness and should be a subject permitted during cross-examination.'" Id. After an in
camera review of the files, the judge directed the information to be released to the defendants. See id.
During a pre-trial hearing held by the judge to resolve the privilege issue, Doe refused to answer all questions relating to his psychiatric history, invoking the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See id. The judge therefore held him in contempt of court.
See id. The district court judge stayed the execution of the order to allow Doe to appeal
the ruling to the court of appeals. See id.
See id.
60 See id. at 1327-28 (noting the Supreme Court's affirmation that Rule 501 confirmed
a positive intention not to paralyze privilege law, rather the purpose of the rule was to
allow courts flexibility to expand the law through case-by-case inquiry).
5
56
57
58
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of acquiring informed medical assistance. 6 1 The court subsequently held
that the privilege was limited, however, to only those instances where the
privacy interest of the witness outweighs the evidentiary need for the
witness's psychiatric history. 62 After analyzing the facts of the case in
the context of this test, the court held that the privilege should
not apply
63
to Doe, and he must therefore disclose his psychiatric files.
The issue of whether to recognize the psychotherapist 4 ,atient privilege was also tackled by the Sixth Circuit in In re Zuniga. In Zuniga,
the Sixth Circuit consolidated for rjpeal two civil contempt orders issued
by separate federal district courts.
The two lower courts held the appel61 See id. at 1328.
62 See Doe, 964 F.2d at 1328-29. The court, after recognizing the privilege, stated:
"we also recognize, as appellant concedes, that the privilege is highly qualified and requires a case-by-case assessment of whether the evidentiary need for the psychiatric history of a witness outweighs the privacy interests of that witness." Id. (citing In re Zuniga 714 F.2d 632, 639 (6th Cir. 1983)).
See id. at 1329. The court stated:
Although appellant's psychiatric files do contain material that squarely

implicates his privacy interests, the balance in this case weighs overwhelmingly in favor of allowing an inquiry into his history of mental illness. Appellant is not only the person who initiated the criminal investigation
against Diamond but also a witness whose credibility will be the central issue at trial. He has a long history of emotional illness, and there is expert
psychiatric opinion in the record that this history is relevant to his credibility.... We agree with Chief Judge Plait that a preclusion of any inquiry
into appellant's psychiatric history would violate the Confrontation Clause
and vitiate any resulting conviction of Diamond.
Id.

714 F.2d 632, 636 (6th Cir. 1983).
Two separate courts of the Eastern District of Michigan held the
appellants, Jorge S. Zuniga and Gary S. Pierce, in contempt of court for not properly responding to a subpoena duces tecum issued by a grand jury. See id.
Pierce was a licensed psychiatrist, practicing medicine in Michigan. See id. When
the Grand Jury for the Eastern District of Michigan served a subpoena duces tecum on
Pierce, requiring him to appear and produce certain records, Pierce refused. See id. He
filed a motion to quash the subpoena, which was denied by the district court judge. See
id. After further efforts at resistance by Pierce, the district court found him in civil contempt, issuing a court order placing him in the custody of the United States Marshal until
he agreed to comply with the subpoena. See id. at 634-35. The district court granted a
stay in the execution of its order pending appeal. See id. at 635.
Zuniga was a licensed psychiatrist, practicing in the State of Michigan. See id. He
was similarly served with a subpoena duces tecum, commanding him to produce certain
records to the district court. See id. When he filed a motion to quash the subpoena, the
district judge denied the motion, but limited the subpoena to the records pertaining to 75
individuals. See id. The judge also restricted the scope of the subpoena to apply only to
the five years preceding the service of the subpoena. See id.
After this order limiting the scope of the subpoena, the government served a second
subpoena on Zuniga. See id. Zuniga again filed a motion to quash, and persistently refused to comply with the second subpoena. See id. at 636. At this point, the district
f4

65 See id. at 634.
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lant psychiatrists in contempt of court for refusing to provide psychiatric
records of their patients to a grand jury, which requested them through a
subpoena duces tecum.66
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling, while at the
same time recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege. 6 Finding that
the expressed interests in favor of the privilege outweighed the want for
evidence in the management of criminal justice, the court held that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege was "mandated by reason and experience.
Mirroring Doe, however, the court did not find that the privilege applied to the facts of the case. Because the information sought by
the subpoena related only to the identity of certain patients, as well as the
dates and times of their treatments, the court found that the information
was not privileged, and forced disclosure. 71
court found Zuniga to be in contempt of court "and remanded him to the custody of the
United States Marshal until such time as Zuniga purged himself of contempt by compliance." Id. The district court granted a stay in the execution of this order pending Zuniga's appeal. See id.
The two appeals were consolidated pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure because the two issues, as well as the arguments presented, were
identical. See id. Both parties contended that the documents sought by the government
were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See id.
6See
id. at 634. Subpoena duces tecum is defined as:
A court process, initiated by a party in litigation, compelling production of
certain specified documents and other items, material and relevant to facts
in issue in a pending judicial proceeding, which documents and items are
in custody and control of a person or body served with process.
BLAcK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 1426 (6th ed. 1990) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 45; FED. R. Canm.
P. 17; People v. Grosunor, 439 N.Y.S.2d 243, 249 (Crim. Ct. 1981)).
67 See Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639,
642.
68 See id. at 640. The court noted that the interests behind a psychotherapist-patient
privilege were extensive. See id. at 639. Among these interests is that confidentiality is a
necessity for acquiring successful treatmenL See id. "The inability to obtain effective
psychiatric treatment may preclude the enjoyment and exercise of many fundamental
freedoms, particularly those protected by the First Amendment." Id.
69 See id. (quoting FED. R. EviD. 501). Although recognizing the privilege,
the court
expressly declined to define the boundaries of the privilege. See id. As the court stated:
Just as the recognition of privileges must be undertaken on a case-by-case
basis, so too must the scope of the privilege be considered. This is necessarily so because the appropriate scope of a privilege, like the propriety of
the privilege itself, is determined by balancing the interests protected by
shielding the evidence sought with those advanced by disclosure.

Id. at 639-40 (citations omitted).

M See id. at 640.
See id. The court stated that
[tihe essential element of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is its assurance to the patient that his innermost thoughts may be revealed without fear
of disclosure. Mere disclosure of the patient's identity does not negate this
element. Thus, the Court concludes that, as a general rule, the identity of
a patient or the fact and time of his treatment does not fall within the scope

71
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Other circuit courts have declined to recognize the psychotherapist-

patient privilege. 72 In United States v. Burtrum, 3 the Tenth Circuit was
faced with the question of whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege
should exist in criminal child sexual abuse cases.74 At the district court
level, the defendant was charged with sexual child abuse. 75 Burtrum had
undergone therapy shortly after the incidents, at which time he admitted
to the crimes and was further diagnosed as a pedophile. 76 The defendant
attempted to exclude this evidence based on the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, but the district court denied his request.T' The district court
did recognize a qualified psychotherapist-patient privilege based on the
reasoning in Doe,78 but found that the public interest in safeguarding
children from sexual abuse substantially outweighed the defendant's privacy interest as well as the desire for informed medical assistance. 79 As
a result, the district court held that Burtrum's admission of guilt to his
psychotherapist was admissible.8 0
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision but refused
to recognize even a qualified psychotherapist-patient privilege.8 1 The
court reasoned that privileges are generally disfavored because they cause
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Accordingly, the information
sought by the grand jury subpoenas is not privileged.

Id. gootnote omitted).
See United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 1994); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d
562 567 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir. 1976).
17 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1994).
74 See id. at 1300. Appellant Wilkie Bill Burtrum, Jr., was convicted
of sexually
abusing children, a violation of federal criminal law. See id.; see aLso 18 U.S.C. §§
2241(c), 2244(a)(1) (Supp. 1996) (malng sexual abuse a federal crime if done within the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or in federal prison).
Burtrum appealed his conviction, contending that the district court erred by admitting testimony, which he believed was privileged, from his psychotherapist. See Burtrwn, 17
F.3d at 1300. The court of appeals, in determining whether to recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege, expressly limited its holding solely to those cases "in a criminal child sexual abuse context." Id. at 1301-02.
75 See id. at 1300. Burtrum was actually convicted
of two counts of "oral sodomy
with a child under the age of twelve." Id. The offenses in question occurred within Indian territory, which conferred jurisdiction upon the federal court to hear the case. See
id.; see aLso 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153 (1984 & Supp. 1996) (making offenses committed
within "Indian Country" subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States).
76 See Burtrwn, 17 F.3d at 1300.
77 See id. at 1300-01.
79 964 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992). See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying
text for a
discussion of Doe.
79 See Burtrwm, 17 F.3d at 1301.
8D See id.
81 See id. at 1302 (finding that "significant evidentiary need compels the
admission of
this type of relevant evidence in child sexual abuse prosecutions," and therefore refusing
to recognize the privilege in these limited circumstances).
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the repression of otherwise competent evidence.82 In addition, the court

opined that Congress specifically declined to recognize a psychotherapistpatient privilege by adopting Rule 501. 83 The court did, however, expresslz limit its decision to the context of child sexual abuse prosecutions.
The Ninth Circuit similarly declined to recognize the privilege in In
re GrandJury Proceedings.8 5 In that case, a federal grand jury was investigating the death of an infant child by targeting the child's mother,
As a part of its investigation, the grand jury served subpoeJane Doe.

nas to compel production of Doe's psychiatric and hospital records. 87
Doe filed a motion to quash the subpoenas, claiming that the information
After a
sought was subject to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.8s
comand
motion
denied
Doe's
hearing on the issue, the district court
89
pelled production of the information.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding of the district
court and did not recognize the privilege. 90 The court held that Rule 501
encompassed only those privileges in existence at common law, and the

82 See id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 842 F.2d 244, 246 (10th Cir.
1987)) (stating that there is "a strong presumption against testimonial privileges because
the]result in the suppression of competent evidence").
See id. (finding that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was nonexistent at common law, and Congress has also chosen not to recognize the privilege). The court further
found that Congress, in adopting Rule 501, preserved the federal law of privilege as it
existed, rather than delineating specific privileges, like the psychotherapist-patient privileges See id.
See Burtrwn, 17 F.3d at 1302.
96 867 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1989).
See id. at 563. Jane Doe's child died on a federal reservation "located within the
Special Federal Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States." Id. Doe was
the subject of the grand jury investigation, but contended that the cause of death of her
child was Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. See id. Because murder was suspected, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation began an investigation, and a federal grand jury was also
convened to investigate. See id. at 563-64.
87 See id. at 564. The government directed these subpoenas to Doe's treating psychiatrist, Dr. John Roe, along with two hospitals where Doe had earlier received treatment. See id. Dr. Roe stated in an affidavit to the grand jury that Doe possessed a
"fragile" mental condition, and that "based upon her past history, he felt release of her
confidential medical information could 'seriously threaten her mental health.'" Id. Both
Dr. Roe and the two hospitals, however, agreed to provide the information requested in
the subpoenas if the court so ordered. See id.
98 See id.
s9 See id. The district judge conducted a telephone hearing, at which time he consolidated all Doe's motions and denied them--granting the government's motion to compel production. See id. Doe filed a timely appeal, and the Ninth Circuit granted a stay of
the execution of the order pending appeal. See id.
90 See In re GrandJury Proceedings, 867 F.2d at 565.
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psychotherapist-patient privilege was not. 91 The court specifically declined to reach the merits of whether the privilege was justified, holding
that it was up to Congress to define new privileges in the context of federal criminal proceedings.
As a result, the court ordered Doe to produce her psychiatric records to the grand jury.9 3
In United States v. Corona,94 the Eleventh Circuit also faced the issue of whether to recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 95 In
Corona, the defendant was charged with the crime of purchasing firearms
while addicted to a controlled substance. 9 6 To prove that Corona was
addicted to a controlled substance, the government offered evidence of
his treatment at a drug rehabilitation center, including testimony from his
psychiatrist. 97 The district court rejected Corona's motion to exclude the
91 See id. The court further noted that the psychotherapist-patient privilege has doveled strictly through state statutes. See id.
See id. The court stated specifically:
We note that the Hippocratic tradition of physician non-disclosure of patient secrets is ancient; we decline to reach the merits of the efficacy of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege by this holding, but we do opine that if
such a privilege is to be recognized in federal criminal proceedings, it is up
to Congress to define it, not this court.
Id.
93 See id.
94 849 F.2d 562 (1lth Cir. 1988).
9" See id. at 566-67.
96 See id. at 562-63. Ray L. Corona was charged with 18 violations of 18 U.S.C.
sections 922(a)(6) and 922(h)(3), otherwise known as the Drug Control Act of 1968. See
id. These provisions essentially make it unlawful for a person to "make any false or fictitious oral or written statement... intended or likely to deceive" any importer, collector, manufacturer, or dealer of firearms when purchasing a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §
922(a)(6) (1976 & Supp. 1996). In addition, the statute forbids any "unlawful user of or
[person] addicted to" any controlled substance to receive firearms. See id. § 922(h)(3).
On several occasions between October 1981 and October 1984, Corona purchased
nine firearms from the Tamiami Gun Shop of Miami. See Corona, 849 F.2d at 563.
During each purchase, the defendant completed a form published by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, that was designed to detect statutorily-prohibited purchasers
of firearms. See id. Corona continually answered "no" to the question on the form asking "'[a]re you an unlawful user of, or addicted to marijuana, or a depressant, stimulant,
or narcotic drug?'" Id. The government contended that these negative responses resulted in a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), and that his use of cocaine during the
three-year period in which he bought the guns resulted in a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922pi)(3). See id.
See Corona, 849 F.2d at 563. The government offered as evidence testimony of
Corona's private psychiatrist, Dr. Roberto Ruiz, who treated Corona weekly between
August 1980 and January 1981. See id. During these sessions Corona confided to Dr.
Ruiz that he had become an extensive cocaine user, after initially starting as a social user.
See id. Dr. Ruiz also learned from Corona that he often spent up to $10,000 per month
to satisfy his habit. See id. at 564. Although Dr. Ruiz did not come to the conclusion
that Corona was actually an addict, he did officially classify him as a "chronic cocaine
user." See id.
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testimony and held that there was no psychotherapist-patient privilege in
Circuit. 98 As a result, Corona was concriminal actions in the Eleventh
99
victed in the district court.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Corona's conviction.100 In
declining to recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the court reasoned that the privilege was a derivative form of the physician-patient
privilege, which was not recognized either at common law or at the federal level by statute.101 In addition, the court reiterated the findings of
the Supreme Court in emphasizing that privileges "are not lightly created
nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for
truth." 102 Accordingly, the court declined to recognize the privilege in
federal criminal trials.03
The Fifth Circuit also faced this issue in United States v.
Meagher.104 In Meagher, the defendant was convicted in the district
court for bank robbery.105 In response to Meagher's defense of insanity
the government offered testimony of medical witnesses, one of whom was
Meagher's psychiatrist. 106 Meagher claimed that the psychiatrist's recThe government further offered as evidence testimony from a former acquaintance
of Corona, Shelley Phillips. See id. at 563. Phillips testified that she socialized with Corona several times between 1981 and 1983, and that each time they consumed cocaine
roughly twelve times each night. See id.
The government finally introduced as evidence records of Corona's treatment at the
Palm Beach Institute (PBI). See id. at 564. Corona entered the institute on two separate
occasions between 1981 and 1983, for treatment of a chemical substance abuse problem.
See id. Corona's therapist and other workers at PBI were under the impression that Corona was addicted to cocaine. See id.
98 See id. The court also denied the motion made by Corona to exclude the PBI records. See id. The PBI file itself contained 130 pages of information about Corona. See
id. In its ruling, the court limited the amount of records allowed into evidence to 13
pagw. See id.
See id. The jury convicted Corona on all 18 counts. See id. The court sentenced
him to one year in prison and five years of probation. See id.
100 See id. at 568.
101 See id. at 567.

102 Corona, 949 F.2d at 567 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710
(1974)).
103 See id.
104 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1976).
105 See id. at 752. William Joseph Meagher was found guilty of robbing the Florida

Northside Bank in Jacksonville, Florida. See id. His only defense to the charge was insanity, and he offered testimony from nine medical witnesses in support of that defense.
See id.
106 See id. The government offered into evidence the testimony and records of Dr.
Samuel Yochelson, a psychiatrist employed by the National Institute of Mental Health,
located in Washington, D.C. See id. at 752-53. Meagher had been a member of Dr. Yochelson's program of researching criminal behavior between 1971 and 1973. See id. at
753. The two maintained a somewhat routine correspondence level during the time period, and the psychiatrist testified that "in his professional opinion and as a result of his
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ords were protected under the physician-patient
privilege, but the court
7
disagreed, and Meagher was found guilty. 1

On appeal in Meagher the Fifth Circuit declined to recognize a
privilege for this information. l o The court first noted that Rule 501
governed its recognition of new privileges, limiting the court to those
common law principles as defined by federal courts in view of
"experience and reason." 109 The court further held that because no physician-patient privilege existed at common law, it would not now recognize such a privilege in federal criminal trials.1 " 0 Additionally, the court
buttressed its position in finding that Congress expressly declined to
adopt Proposed Rule 504, which would have created a specific psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal courts."' The court found that even
if Congress had adopted the rule, this privilege would not have applied to

situations where a patient was relying on his mental condition as a part of
his defense.112

As a result, the court concluded that this information

long personal contact with defendant, he did not believe the defendant to have been insane at the time of the bank robbery." Id.
107 See id. at 752.
108 See id. at 753.
109 See Meagher, 531 F.2d at 753. (citing FED. R. EVID. 501).
110 See id. (citing United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 1971)).
See id.; see aLso 51 F.R.D. 315, 366 (1971). Proposed Rule 504(b) states:
A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications, made for the purposes of
diagnosis or treatment of his mental or emotional condition, among himself, his psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis
or treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members
of the patient's family.
Id. In addition, Proposed Rule 504(c) states that "[t]he privilege may be claimed by the
patient, by his guardian or conservator, or by the personal representative of a deceased
patient. The person who was the psychotherapist may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the patient." Id.
Congress did not enact Proposed Rule 504, but instead enacted current Rule 501 in
its place. See MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 76.1, at 108. For a discussion of the Proposed Rules of Evidence, see supra note 14.
112 See Meagher, 531 F.2d at 753. The court stated:
[[In its Proposed Rules of Evidence, Rule 504, the Supreme Court recommended a psychotherapist-patient privilege, but expressly excepted from
the privilege those situations in which the patient relies upon his mental
condition as an element of his defense; i.e., whenever the defendant raises
an insanity defense. This proposed psychotherapist-patient privilege was
not accepted by Congress in its final enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence; yet, even if such a privilege had been adopted via the Supreme
Court's proposed rules, it could not be utilized when the defendant in a
criminal trial claims insanity as a defense.
Id. (citations omitted).
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would not have
113 been protected even had the court decided to recognize
the privilege.
With this split in the circuit courts as a background, the Supreme

Court granted certiorari 1 4 in Jaffee v. Redmond to definitively answer
the question of whether the federal courts should adopt the psychotherapist-patient privilege under Rule 501.15 In Jaffee, the Court not only
held that recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege in the federal
courts was mandated by Rule 501, but also that it6 should extend to all li-

censed social workers providing psychotherapy.I1

Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, 1 7 began by analyzing Rule
501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which mandates the Court to circumscribe new privileges by defining the principles of the common law
with a view toward "reason and experience. "
The Justice found that
Congress's intention was not to hinder the development of privileges by
adopting Rule 501, but rather that such new privileges are more appro-

priately defined through a case-by-case analysis.1

9

In defining exactly

what the common law principles are that underlie the recognition of new
testimonial privileges, and would guide the court in its analysis, Justice
Stevens referred to the fundamental adage that the public is entitled to
"every man's evidence." 120 The Justice defined the general common law
12
disposition as unsympathetic to testimonial privileges. 1
113 See id.
114 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 334 (1995).
115 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1927 (1996).
116 See id. at 1931.
117 See id. at 1925. Justice Stevens was joined in the majority opinion by Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id.
l19 See id. at 1927; see also Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74,
79 (1958) (stating
that changes in privileges should be directed by "reason and experience"); Funk v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933) (finding that "the common law is not immutable
but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions").
119 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927-28. (citing University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493
U.S.
182, 189 (1990); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)). The Justice stated:
The Senate Report accompanying the 1975 adoption of the Rules indicates
that Rule 501 "should be understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential relationship... should be determined on a case-by-case basis." The Rule thus did not freeze the law
governing the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular point in
our history, but rather directed federal courts to "continue the evolutionary
development of testimonial privileges."
Id. citations omitted).
See id. at 1928. The Justice qualified this fundamental common law principle,
however, by stating that exceptions to the rule would be justified if there was a "public
good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining the truth.'" See id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50).
121 See id.
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Guided by these standards, the Court turned to the issue of whether
the psychotherapist-patient privilege is mandated under common law
principles. 122 Justice Stevens began by equating the psychotherapistpatient privilege with both the husband-wife and the attorney-client
privileges, positing that all three require confidence and trust for a successful relationship. 13 The Court further observed that the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee recommended to Congress in 1972 that it
adopt a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege for inclusion in the Federal Rules of Evidence.'24 Based on this reasoning, Justice Stevens concluded that the proposed privilege served important private interests.12
The Court made it clear, however, that the proposed privilege must
also advance public ends. 126 Justice Stevens declared that the psychotherapist-patient privilege does serve the public ends by promoting the
appropriate treatment for those people suffering from a mental or emo-

122 See id. Justice Stevens stated:
Guided by these principles, the question we address today is whether a
privilege protecting confidential communications between a psychotherapist
and her patient "promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the
need for probative evidence ....
Both "reason and experience" persuade us that it does.
Id.Icitation omitted).
See id. Justice Stevens noted that physician treatment for physical ailments can be
successful without these elements of "confidence and trust." See id. "Effective psychotherapy, by contrast, depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the
patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories,
and fears." Id. Public disclosure of confidential information necessary for successful
treatment would likely cause embarrassment. See id. As a result, the mere prospect of
exposure of these communications could very well serve to hinder the growth of the confidential relationship needed for successful treatment. See id.
124 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928-29. The Justice quoted the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee in part, saying that the ability of a psychiatrist to assist a patient
is completely dependent upon [the patients'] willingness and ability to talk
freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for [a psychiatrist] to function without being able to assure... patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication. Where there may be exceptions to ths
general rule . ..,there is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua
non for successful psychiatric treatment.
Id. at 1928.
125 See id. at 1929.
126 See id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). Justice
Stevens also outlined the public interests in both the attorney-client and husband-wife
privileges. See id. According to the Justice, the goal of the attorney-client privilege is to
"encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice."
Id. (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389). In addition, justification for the husband-wife
privilege is that it advances the public's special interest in harmonious marital relations.
See id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53).
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tional disturbance.127 The Justice held that the mental health of citizens
of the United States is a public goal that is of predominant concern.12
The Court next contrasted these public and private interests with the
potential evidentiary benefit that would result if the Court refused to recognize the privilege. 129 Justice Stevens held this benefit to be a modest
one. 130 The Justice found that the absence of such a privilege would effectively chill conversations with psychotherapists, and patients would
never convey to a therapist the evidence sought by most litigants in the
first place.131 As a result, the Court noted that this would not aid in the
truth-seeking function because if there was no privilege, a psychotherapist would receive little or no information. 32 Based on this reasoning,
Justice Stevens found it appropriate to recognize the psychotherapistpatient privilege in federal court under Rule 501.133
The Court buttressed its decision to recognize the privilege by noting that all fifty states have enacted at least some type of psychotherapistpatient privilege. 134 Justice Stevens found that a patient's promise of
127
128
129
130

See id.
See id.
See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929.
See id. (finding that "the likely evidentiary benefit that would result from
the denial
of the privilege is modest").
131 See id. "Ifthe privilege were rejected, confidential conversations between
psychotherapists and their patients would surely be chilled, particularly when it is obvious that
the circumstances that give rise to the need for treatment will probably result in litigation." Id.
132 See id. Justice Stevens further proffered:
Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which litigants such
as petitioner seek access-for example, admissions against interest by a
party---is unlikely to come into being. This unspoken "evidence" will
therefore serve no greater truth-seeking function than if it had been spoken
and privileged.
Id.
133 See id. at 1930. T"e Court stated
that
[bjecause we agree with the judgment of the state legislatures and the Advisory Committee that a psychotherapist-patient privilege will serve a
"public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing

all rational means for ascertaining truth," we hold that confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the
course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled disclosure
under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Id. at 1931 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
134 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929-30. Justice Stevens observed that the Court
has
previously considered the policy decisions behind the recognition of privileges in the
States, and that these considerations are relevant to a situation where federal courts may
either recognize a new privilege or alter the scope of an already existing one. See id.
(citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-50 (1980)). For a citation to statutes
in the 50 states and the District of Columbia that recognize the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, see supra note 23.
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confidentiality, if made by the states, would have little or no value if the
Supreme Court declined to recognize the privilege in the federal
courts. 135 Patients would realize that the confidentiality extended only to
state courts, the Justice proffered, and denying the privilege in the federal
courts would
only serve to frustrate the purposes of the legislation in all
136
the states.
After recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Court
next faced the issue of whether to extend the privilege to include social
workers. 13 7 Justice Stevens found, without hesitation, that the privilege
should be extended. 13 According to the Justice, counseling sessions
with social workers serve the same public goals as do those with psychotherapists or psychiatrists. 139 Furthermore, the Justice concluded that in
today's society, social workers provide a significant amount of mental
health treatment, usually to those who cannot afford to see a psychiatrist
or psychotherapist. 140 As a result, the Court concluded that not only
See id. at 1930.
136 See id. The Court stated
that
[blecause state legislatures are fully aware of the need to protect the integrity of the factfinding functions of their courts, the existence of a consensus among the States indicates that "reason and experience" support
recognition of the privilege. In addition, given the importance of the patient's understanding that her communications with her therapist will not be
publicly disclosed, any State's promise of confidentiality would have little
value if the patient were aware that the privilege would not be honored in a
federal court. Denial of the federal privilege therefore would frustrate the
purposes of the state legislation that was enacted to foster these confidential
communications.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Court further found it inconsequential that the vast majority of
states enacted the privilege legislatively, rather than by judicial decision. See id. Justice
Stevens found that the current unanimous legislative acceptance of the privilege demonstrates that state lawmakers acted quickly. See id. The Justice commented that this fast
legislative development, as opposed to judicial development, simply demonstrated the fact
that legislators quickly realized the necessity of the rule during the evolution of the field
of ychotherapy. See id.
"'--See id. at 1931.
138 See id.
139 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931. The Court stated that if the petitioner had filed her
135

claim in the state court in Illinois, the privilege issue would have been upheld without
question, at least on the state wrongful death claim. See id. n.15. Rule 501 would have
extended any state-law privilege to that proceeding, according to Justice Stevens. See id.
The Court also noted the disagreement over what rule should be applied where both
federal and state claims are asserted in federal court, and the relevant evidence would not
be privileged under federal law, yet would be privileged under state law. See id. (citing
CHARLEs MAN WmaGhT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 23 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PRCEDURE § 5435 (1980)). Because neither side raised the issue the Court declined to
express an opinion on the matter. See id.
See id. at 1931. The Court found that social workers often provide therapy to
those underprivileged people who could not afford to be treated by an expensive psychia-
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should it adopt the psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal courts, but
the privilege
should extend to those social workers providing psychother141
apy.

Justice Scalia began the dissent 42 by stating that the majority neglected to discuss one of the negative impacts that would result from a
recognition of the privilege, namely occasional injustice."
In addition,
the Justice stated that the Court's decision directly contradicted the principle that testimonial privileges are disfavored, for they impede the
search for truth. 144 Justice Scalia also found that the privilege created by
the Court was unlimited and undefined. 145
trist or psychologist. See id. In recognition of this, the Court also found that nearly all
states expressly extend the testimonial privilege to licensed social workers. See id. The
Justice concluded by agreeing with the circuit court that there is no discernible public
purpose for distinguishing between the counseling rendered by expensive psychotherapists and the counseling furnished by more easily accessible social workers. See id.at
1931-32.
The Court did, however, "part company" with the court of appeals on a separate issue. See id.at 1932. The Justice rejected the balancing element of the privilege that was
adopted by the circuit court and a small contingent of the states. See id. The Court disagreed with the principle of having a trial judge compare the importance of a patient's privacy interest with the evidentiary demand for disclosure in court long after the conversation had taken place. See id. Tlhis, the Court felt, would eviscerate the efficacy of the
privilege. See id. As a result, the Court stated that:
if the purpose of the privilege is to be served, the participants in the confidential conversation "must be able to predict with some degree of certainty
whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege,

or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."
Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
4 See id.at 1931.
142 See id.at 1932 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined by Chief
Justice
Rhenquist, but only in Part Im of the opinion. See id. The Chief Justice agreed with Justice Scalia only on the point that the psychotherapist-patient privilege should not be extended to social workers. See id.at 1936 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143 See id.at 1932 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that there is a cost that
must be paid for every rule that excludes probative and reliable evidence. See id. The
Justice equated the psychotherapist-patient privilege to the rule that excludes confessions
taken when the defendant has not received Miranda warnings. See id.(citing Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966)). The Justice further commented that "the victim of
the injustice is always the impersonal State or the faceless 'public at large.'" Id.
In the present type of situation, the Justice noted that the victim will very likely be
someone who will be obstructed (by the privilege) from establishing a valid cause of action, or worse still, a person who would be obstructed from proving a warranted defense.
See id.at 1932-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The latter situation was found by the Justice to
be particularly distasteful because not only does it cause the courts of law to uphold a

wrong, but it results in the courts themselves becoming the instruments of that wrong.
See id.at 1933 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144 See Jaffee, 116 S. CL at 1933 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent proffered
that
the Supreme Court has recognized in the past that courts have been specifically given the
mandate of preserving justice, and that this mandate would be severely impeded by con-
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The dissent next tackled the analysis used by the majority in recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege. 146 Justice Scalia characterized
the Court's analysis as a misdirection, alleging that more emphasis
should have been given to the question of whether the privilege should
apply to social workers than merely whether to recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 147 In addition, the Justice commented that the
Court's reliance on the recommendation of the Advisory Committee in its
Proposed Rules'" was faulty, because the Advisory Committee's privilege would not have extended to social workers. 14 Justice Scalia contravening the general canon that "the public... has a right to every man's evidence."
See id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Justice Scalia further noted that the Court has adhered to the aforementioned principle to such an extent in the past that it has rejected attempts at recognizing
new privileges under Rule 501. See id. In addition, the Justice posited, even when the
Court did recognize a privilege, it adhered to the principle of construing the scope of that
privilege narrowly. See id. (citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 568-70 (1989)
(permitting in camera review of documents alleged to come within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege); Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53 (holding that voluntary testimony by a spouse is not covered by the husband-wife privilege)).
145 See id. Justice Scalia commented that the majority opinion effectively abandoned
the established judicial inclination for the truth, and in the process created a privilege that
was "vast[ I] and ill-defined." See id.
146 See id.
147 See id.

at 1933-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia observed that the majority
simplified its job remarkably by its procedure in analyzing the issues. See id. The Justice noted that the majority began
by characterizing the issue as "whether it is appropriate for federal courts
to recognize a 'psychotherapist privilege,'" and devotes almost all of its
opinion to that question. Having answered that question (to its satisfaction)
in the affirmative, it then devotes less than a page of text to answering in
the affirmative the small remaining question whether "the federal privilege
should also extend to confidential communications made to licensed social
workers in the course of psychotherapy."
Id. at 1933 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia finally commented that by relegating the
major question actually propounded by the case to nothing more than a postscript, the
ma'ority "makes the impossible possible in a number of wonderful ways. " See id.
43 See Proposed Rule of Evidence 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240 (1973).
For further information regarding the Proposed Rules of Evidence, see supranote 14.
149 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1933-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justice conceded
that the Advisory Committee on the Proposed Rule of Evidence did in fact recommend a
type of psychotherapist-patient privilege. See id. at 1934 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia, however, noted that the Advisory Committee advocated a privilege for psychotherapy provided by authorized medical doctors, including psychiatrists, or licensed or
certified psychologists. See id. (citing Proposed Rule of Evidence 504, 56 F.R.D. at
240). As a result, the dissent concluded that the Advisory Committee would not have
recommended the privilege at issue in Jaffee. See id. Justice Scalia finally concluded:
[tihat condemnation is obscured, and even converted into an endorsement,
by pushing a "psychotherapist privilege" into the center ring. The Proposed Rule figures prominently in the Court's explanation of why that
privilege deserves recognition, and is ignored in the single page devoted to
the sideshow which happens to be the issue presented for decision.
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cluded on this point by stating that the actions of the majority were in
clear contravention of the Court's duty to
advance tentatively when creat15 0
ing barriers between itself and the truth.
The dissent next questioned whether the majority should have recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege at all.
Justice Scalia
opined that the alleged benefits of the privilege were insufficient to outweigh the detriment of affording occasional injustice. 152 In addition, the
Justice discounted the majority's argument that not recognizing the
privilege would result in less information being conveyed to providers of

Id.
1citations omitted).
See id. Justice Scalia stated that the Court's methodology itself was violative of its
duty to proceed cautiously when creating privileges because it gave more serious consideration to the much more general, easier question of whether to recognize the privilege
for psychotherapists, than to the much harder question of whether it should extend to social workers. See id.
151 See id. The Justice phrased the central question as: "are [the benefits
of the privilege] of such importance, and is the contribution of psychotherapy to them so distinctive,
and is the application of normal evidentiary rules so destructive to psychotherapy, as to
justfy making our federal courts occasional instruments of injustice?" Id.
12 See id.
Justice Scalia also questioned when exactly it was that psychiatrists and
psychotherapists came to be so indispensable to the maintenance of the mental health of
our nation. See id. The Justice commented that throughout the history of society, people
solved their problems by talking to friends, siblings, bartenders, parents, and spouses.
See id. Justice Scalia subsequently posited diat the average person's mental health would
be more significantly impaired if they were unable to receive advice from their mother
than if they were not allowed to visit a psychotherapist. See id. Yet, the Justice concluded, there is no "mother-child privilege." See id.

1150

SETON HALL LAWREWEW

[Vol. 27:1123

psychotherapy. 153 The dissent also found unappealing the Court's argument that not recognizing the privilege would frustrate state law. 154
Justice Scalia further argued that the actuality of all fifty states having adopted at least some form of the privilege is an argument against,
rather than for, adoption of the privilege. 155 According to the dissent,
the statutory enactment in a majority of the states suggested that this type

153 See id. at 1935 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

In commenting upon the majority's argu-

ment that disclosure to psychotherapists would be effectively chilled by a nonrecognition
of the privilege, the dissent asked the following questions: "[i]f that is so, how come psychotherapy got to be a thriving practice before the 'psychotherapist privilege' was invented? Were the patients paying money to lie to their analysts all those years?" Id.
Justice Scalia further posited that even were it certain that not recognizing the privilege would result in the inhibition of disclosure to psychotherapists, this is not necessarily
a bad thing. See id. The Justice disagreed with the idea that a guilty person would be
able to obtain the benefits of admitting his or her crime to a psychotherapist (thus benefiting mentally), while at the same time benefiting by not having to admit that fact in criminal court. See id. The Justice further stated that:
[iut
seems to me entirely fair to say that if she wishes the benefits of telling
the truth she must also accept the adverse consequences. To be sure, in

most cases the statements to the psychotherapist will be only marginally
relevant, and one of the purposes of the privilege (though not one relied
upon by the Court) may be simply to spare patients needless intrusion upon
their privacy, and to spare psychotherapists needless expenditure of their
time in deposition and trial. But surely this can be achieved by means
short of excluding even evidence that is of the most direct and conclusive
effect.
Id.

See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1935 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent responded to the
majority's argument that not recognizing the privilege would frustrate state laws enacted
to foster confidential communications by referring to it as a novel argument, and a type of
inverse preemption. See id. Justice Scalia declared that the Court's reasoning did not
square with that of the Supreme Court in United States v. Gillock, where the Court declined to adopt a privilege for Tennessee legislators in federal court, even though the
privilege was guaranteed in state proceedings under the Tennessee Constitution. See id.
(citing 445 U.S. 360, 368 (1980)). Furthermore, according to the dissent, state policies
regarding the privilege vary to such an extent that it would be impossible for a uniform
federal policy to honor a majority of them. See id. As Justice Scalia stated: "[i]f furtherance of state policies is the name of the game, rules of privilege in federal courts should
vam from State to State, a la Erie." Id.
a See id. at 1936 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia proffered that perhaps
the
privilege has not been enacted judicially because the uses for psychotherapy are so rapidly evolving that only legislation can provide the flexibility that is demanded by the
privilege. See id. The Justice also noted that only four state court decisions have ever
even considered adopting, in common law form, a psychotherapist-patient privilege. See
id. n.1 (citing Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469, 473-74 (Alaska
1977); Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 416-17 (Alaska 1976); State v. Evans, 454 P.2d
976, 978 (Ariz. 1969); In re "B", 394 A.2d 419, 425 (Pa. 1978)). As a result, Justice
Scalia suggested that the Court's declaration should be revised to state that "the common
law had indicated scant disposition to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege when
(oreven after) legislatures began moving into the field." Id.
154
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of privilege is better left to the state legislatures.15 6 Lastly, the Justice
concluded that to rest such a federal privilege on the unanimous judgment
of the states is faulty because the various states all differ in their recognition of the privilege. 157
The dissent next analyzed the question of whether the privilege
should extend to social workers. 158 Justice Scalia initially concluded that
to do so would violate the rule that states that privileges must be interpreted narrowly. 159 The Justice also explained that psychiatrists and psychologists differ in many ways from licensed social workers who provide
psychotherapy. 160 Furthermore, the dissent posited that social workers
156 See id. at 1936 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justice noted that this overwhelmingly
legislative adoption of the privilege in the states suggests that adoption of the privilege is
better left to such decision-making bodies where reason can be tempered by certain poliftical pressures such as organized interest groups. See id. In addition, Justice Scalia commented that these decision-maing bodies are often not as concerned with justice as are
the courts. See id. The dissent noted that psychologists and social workers would therefore have a significant impact in this respect through efforts such as lobbying. See id.
157 See id. Justice Scalia equated resting this newly recognized privilege on the
unanimous judgment of the states to a situation where a federal court would recognize "a
new, immediately applicable, federal common law of torts, based upon the States'
'unanimous judgment' that some form of tort law is appropriate." Id. The Justice commented that in both situations, state laws are so varied that both the lower federal judges
as well as the parties to the lawsuit would have "barely a clue" of what this new common
law would entail. See id.
158 See id.
15 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1937 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160 See id. The dissent referred to the fact that the majority expressed not a single
word in reference to how the services provided by a psychiatrist or psychologist, and that
of a social worker, are different. See id. Justice Scalia declared that a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist "is an expert in psychotherapy," which he thought might be sufficient for the recognition of a new privilege based on that relationship between psychotherapist and patient. See id. According to the Justice, however, "[omne must presume
that a social worker does not bring this greatly heightened degree of skill to bear, which
is alone a reason for not encouraging that consultation as generously." Id.
In finiher defining how the two professions are different, Justice Scalia referred to
the Illinois Code's definition of "social worker." See id. (citing 225 ILL. Cou'. STAT.
ANN. 20/9 (West 1993)). Illinois differentiates between "licensed clinical social workers" and "licensed social workers," although the Court's decision recognizing the privilege would apparently apply to both classes, according to Justice Scalia. See id. To become a "licensed clinical social worker" in Illinois, one must have a "master's degree in
social work from an approved program," as well as "3,000 hours of satisfactory, supervised, clinical professional experience." Id. (citing 225 IW. COUP. STAT. ANN. 20/9
(West 1993)). In terms of "licensed social workers," however, the requirements are less
demanding. See id. One must have either: "(a) 'a degree from a graduate program of
social work' approved by the State, or (b) 'a degree in social work from an undergraduate
program' approved by the state, plus '3 years of supervised professional experience.'"
Id. at 1937-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 225 ILL CoM. STAT. ANN. 20/9A (West
1993)). The Justice further stated that:
these are only i/inois' requirements for "social workers." Those of other
States, for all we know, may be even less demanding. Indeed, I am not
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perform a variety of functions, including psychotherapy, and such an extension might create considerable confusion over the capacity in which
the information was provided to the social worker, thus creating administrative problems for the privilege. 161
The dissent also argued that the majority's reliance on state-privilege
law extending the privilege to social workers was unfounded.16z States,
according to Justice Scalia, disagree tremendously on the scope of the
privilege. 163 In addition, the Justice proffered that many of the states
which do recognize a privilege for communications to licensed social
workers do so in a separate statute from the one recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 164 Consequently, Justice Scalia concluded
that, because of the tremendous division on the issues of the psycho-

even sure there is a nationally accepted definition of "social worker," as
there is of psychiatrist and psychologist. It seems to me quite irresponsible

to extend the so-called "psychotherapist privilege" to all licensed social
workers, nationwide, without exploring these issues.
Id. at 1938 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia finally noted that another important distinction between the two professions is that psychiatrists and psychologists only perform
psychotherapy. See id. Social workers, however, interview people for a variety of reasons and in a variety of fashions. See id.
161 See id. The dissent noted that "in applying the 'social worker'
variant of the
'psychotherapist' privilege," it will become essential to conclude whether the evidence
conveyed to the social worker "was provided to him in his capacity as a psychotherapist,
or in his capacity as an administrator of social welfare, a community organizer, etc." id.
The Justice further noted that it will become essential for the social worker to advise the
patient, prior to his or her conversations with them, which portions of their conversations
will be privileged as opposed to which portions will have to be disclosed. See id.
162 See id. Justice Scalia considered the Court's reasoning flawed because
the majority of states that did recognize the privilege for social workers did so by statute, not
through judicial decision. See id. As a result, the Justice considered this "experience of
the States" irrelevant to the ultimate issue of judicial recognition of the privilege. See id.
According to the Justice, therefore, state social-worker privilege statutes provide no support whatsoever to the theory relied upon by the majority. See id. at 1939 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
163 See id. at 1939-40 (Scaa, J., dissenting). Thne dissent noted that
at least four states
have privileges with such gaping exemptions that even the majority recognized that they
amount to little more than no privilege. See id. at 1940 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the Justice noted, five states have specifically refused to adopt a privilege for social
workers, thus contradicting the majority's decision. See id. In addition to these nine
states, Justice Scalia added one state whose "privilege is illusory." See id. (citing WAsH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 18.19.180 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997) (mandating disclosure of information "in response to a subpoena from a court of law")). The Justice concluded that
"in adopting any sort of social worker privilege, then, the Court can at most claim that it
is following the legislative 'experience' of 40 States, and contradicting the 'experience' of
10." Id. at 1939 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For another quote by Justice Scalia regarding
the degree of disagreement between the states, see supra note 22.
164 See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1938 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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therapist-patient privilege and its scope, any adoption and definition of
the privilege should be left to Congress.
The Court's recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege was
well-founded. 166 Thousands of conversations take place every day during
which
very personal
conveyed to both psychiatrists' 67 and
1
psychologists.
A information
confidential isrelationship
between the counselor and
165 See id. at 1940 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia concluded thaL
although the Court is technically correct that "the vast majority of States
explicitly extend a testimonial privilege to licensed social workers," that
uniformity exists only at the most superficial level. No State has adopted
the privilege without restriction; the nature of the restrictions varies enormously from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; and 10 States, I reiterate, effectively reject the privilege entirely. It is fair to say that there is scant national consensus even as to the propriety of a social-worker psychotherapist
privilege, and none whatever as to its appropriate scope. In other words,
the state laws to which the Court appeals for support demonstrate most
convincingly that adoption of a social-worker psychotherapist privilege is a
job for Congress.
Id.I cittion omitted).
But see Abigail Trafford, Health Tab, Second Opinion: Confidence and Confldentia/ity, WASH. POST, June 18, 1996, at Z06 (referring to an opinion of some psychiatrists
that the Supreme Court went "further than it had to" in its decision in Jaffee).
167 See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEMTE DICTIONARY 950 (1983). "Psychiatry" is
defined by Webster's as "a branch of medicine that deals with mental, emotional, or behavioral disorders." Id.
"Psychiatrists are medical doctors." Matthew Mariani, Beyond Psychobabble: Careers in Psychotherapy, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK Q., Spring 1995, at 17, also available
in 1995 WL 9161995. Although psychiatrists do "talk therapy," they also have the ability to prescribe drugs for the treatment of mental illnesses. See id. In today's society,
psychiatrists are beginning to specialize in certain areas to a greater extent than they used
to. See id. Most are specializing in managed health care settings, performing as medication experts. See id.
Psychiatrists, unlike psychologists or social workers, possess the ability to hospitalize a patient if necessary. See id. According to a noted psychiatrist, Dr. Jurand, the
main "advantage" of psychiatrists over other professions "is their access to doing inpatient work, which also means they may get the chance to treat the most severe cases.
Now, that's a mixed blessing. More and more, we're relegated to those cases. Many
psychiatrists like some hospital work, but fairly few want to do exclusively that." Id. at
17-18.
As of 1992, according to the American Medical Association, approximately
37,000 psychiatrists in the United States were involved with patient care. See id. at 18.
Approximately 4000 of those concentrate on the area of child psychiatry. See id.
To become a psychiatrist, one must first obtain a bachelor's degree, which includes
courses in organic and inorganic chemistry, math, biology, and physics. See id. A
medical degree is also required, which usually takes approximately four more years. See
id. While in medical school, an aspiring psychiatrist will take classes in endocrinology,
microbiology, biochemistry, anatomy, genetics, pharmacology, human physiology, the
behavioral sciences, and other subjects. See id. After completing a medical degree, a
residency is required, usually lasting at least four years. See id.
165 See Mariani, supra note 167, at 18. Webster's defines psychology as "the study of
mind and behavior in relation to a particular field of knowledge or activity." WEBmTeR's
NINTH NEw COLMTE DIcnoNARY 951 (1983). There are two types of psychologists:
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patient is required for successful treatment.169 If a patient were to walk
in to his or her therapist's office knowing that what was spoken to the
therapist would not be confidential, any type of communication to that
therapist surely would be chilled, and the most effective treatment would
not result. This confidential nature of communications between the doctor and patient has long been respected and recognized, most prominently
in the Hippocratic Oath. 170
In addition, recent decades have shown a tremendous growth in the
number of people who are willing to take that first step toward getting

clinical and counseling. See Mariani, supra note 167, at 18. The occupations of these
two types of psychologists are very common. See id. Typically, both call for a doctoral
degree. See id. "Compared to the other therapy-providing occupations, clinical and
counseling psychologists have the most extensive training on how to assess mental disorders and do psychotherapy." Id. Recently, the differences between clinical and counseling psychologists have markedly decreased. See id.
According to a 1993 estimate established by the American Psychological Association, approximately 40,000 psychologists, both clinical and counseling, are actively practicing in the United States. See id. at 19. To become a psychologist, one must initially
earn a bachelor's degree. See id. No particular background in college is requiredgraduate students in psychology derive from various backgrounds. See id. Counseling
psychologists are required to obtain a Ph.D. See id. Normally, clinical psychologists are
a product of Ph.D programs as well. See id. Many schools today also offer what is referred to as a Psy.D. (Doctor of Psychology), instead of the traditional Ph.D. in psychology. See id. at 20. This degree requires a minimum of four years to complete. See id.
See Trafford, supra note 166, at Z06 (quoting Washington psychiatrist Stephen
Hersch: "[tihe less confidential things are, the less likely people are to seek some support"). It has been stated that:
[d]iscussing personal issues with someone who can keep secrets fosters
trust. This might help clients form more trusting relationships with others
over time. In a sense, therapists may help clients simply by not abusing
them. This could be a new experience for someone who has grown up in
an abusive family. Those who have suffered emotional, physical, or sexual abuse benefit from seeing that not everyone will try to hurt them.
Mariani, supra note 167, at 15.
170 See Trafford, supra note 166, at Z06. The "doctor-patient confidentiality
rule" has
been a principle of medicine for a very long time. See id. It is embodied in the Hippocratic Oath, which "requires physicians not to 'voice about' what they learn in the course

of caring for patients and to treat such information as 'sacred secrets.'" Id.
Psychotherapists must provide confidentiality to maintain professional ethics and
keep the trust of the client. See Mariani, supra note 167, at 14. It is essential that a patient feel as though he or she can speak freely. See id. Ordinarily, during the patient's
first session, the therapist will describe this confidence, telling the patient that what he or
she says during therapy will not be disclosed to anyone else. See id.; see aLso AMmCwAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF
CONDUCT, Standard 5.01 (Dec. 1992). In addition, some therapists will even suggest that
a patient should interview many different therapists before choosing one, so that the patient will be comfortable enough with that therapist to receive effective treatment. See
Mariani, supra note 167, at 14.
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well by entering a therapist's office. 171 Therapy has also proven to be
incredibly successful. 172 There are however, many more people out
there who have not yet sought help. 173 There is already a stigma attached
to the idea of seeing a therapist; making those communications available
for trial purposes would not aid in the growth of psychotherapy, nor
would it aid in the mental health of our nation's citizenry.
The Court's decision to extend the psychotherapist-patient privilege
to include communications made to licensed social workers "in the
course of psychotherapy" was also appropriate.174 Today, there are over
155,000 employed social workers in the United States, approximately
The suchalf of whom are engaging in some type of psychotherapy.
cess of these social workers depends no less on the confidentiality and

17

See Therapy and Privacy: High Court Was Wise to Shield Sessions, STAR TRIB.

(Minneapolis-St. Paul) June 23, 1996, at 22A [hereinafter Therapy and Privacy].
172 See Martin E.P. Seligman, Insights: Long-Term Psychotherapy Is Highly Effective:
The Consumer Reports Study, HARv. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER, July 1, 1996, at 5. The
results of a Consumer Reports study on the effectiveness of psychotherapy and psychiatric drugs were published by the magazine in its November 1995 issue. See id. The statistical findings and analysis in the study indicated that therapy by mental health professionals on average worked very well. See id. Most individuals responding to these
questions were the beneficiaries of a better mental health state after receiving treatment.
See id. The Consumer Reports study was "the most extensive study of psychotherapeutic
effectiveness on record." Id. at 6.
173 See Therapy and Privacy, supra note 171, at 22A.
174 See Mariani, supra note 167, at 20. Clinical social workers are considered
.psychotherapists," and as such, they "stress the way social situations affect a person's
behavior." Id. Webster's defines "social work" as "any of various professional services, activities, or methods concretely concerned with the investigation, treatment, and
material aid of the economically underprivileged and socially maladjusted." WEBSTER'S
NINTh NEw COLLEGIATB DICTIONARY 1119 (1983). During the course of treatment, a
clinical social worker will note how social systems, such as a person's family, work, government, or neighborhood, play a role in a patient's emotional disorders. See Mariani,
supra note 167, at 20. A clinical social worker may employ several different methods of
treatment, including the involvement of a patient's family, or other therapists if the social
worker deems appropriate. See id. "Social work has traditionally stressed the importance of understanding cultural and other differences." Id.
To become a clinical social worker, one must initially obtain a bachelor's degree.
See id. An aspiring clinical social worker then must obtain a master's degree in social
work (M.S.W.). See id. One requirement for the M.S.W. is a certain amount of clinical
training. See id. A M.S.W. usually takes two to three years to consummate. See id.
Many social workers hold a doctorate degree as well, in the form of either a Ph.D or a
D.S.W. (Doctor of Social Work). See id. Today, the total number of clinical social
workers in the United States exceeds 80,000. See id.
175 See Frank J. Murray, Court Aflows Confidentiality Privilegefor Psychotherapists,
Social Workers, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), June 14, 1996, at A12; see also Mariani, supra
note 167, at 20. This is in comparison to only 37,000 practicing psychiatrists, and
40,000 practicing psychologists in the United States. See Mariani, supra note 167, at 18,
19.
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176
trust of their patients than does that of psychiatrists or psychologists.
Social workers, due to their extraordinary numbers and accessibilitA
have claimed a prominent role in the mental health of the country.
They are also generally much more affordable for the common person.'
As a result, a privilege extending only to psychiatrists and psychologists
would have the practical effect of restricting
the benefits of the privilege
79
to only those who are able to pay for it. 1

Psychotherapists as a group, including psychiatrists, psychologists,
and social workers, have much in common. 1 They all perform similar
functions when providing theragy, even though they may use different
terms to describe what they do.
In addition, their goal is always similar--to relieve their patient from mental suffering.' 2 Furthermore, the
patient's need for such psychotherapy, as well as his or her disclosures
during treatment, will be identical regardless of the discipline of the
therapist. Consequently, a distinction allowing the privilege only to
those who can afford the more expensive therapist is clearly unwarranted.
The Court in Jaffee, however, neglected to properly define the
scope of the privilege. Clinical social workers-as well as clinical and
counseling psychologists, psychiatrists, marriage and family therapists,
and clinical mental health counselors--provide their services in a wide
variety of settings. 183 This naturally raises a number of questions: to
176 See Murray, supra note 175, at A12. Bob Cohen, a lawyer, clinical
social worker,
and the executive director of the National Association of Social Workers, stated that:
"[s]uccessful intervention and treatment requires that the client have the utmost confi-

dence in the confidentiality of what is confided to the professional." Id.

177 See Meg McKeon, Social Workers Have Confidentiality Privilege, BALT.
SUN,

Apr. 6, 1996, at 9A. According to the National Institute of Mental Health, clinical social
work is recognized as one of the "core mental health professions," along with psychiatric
nursing, psychology, and psychiatry. See id. The majority of mental health services in
the United States are provided by clinical social workers. See id.
178 See Vote of Confidence in Confideniality; Supreme Court: Ruling Could
Prove a
Boost for Effective and Affordable Therapy, BALT. SUN, June 21, 1996, at 20A (stating
that "social workers are generally more affordable and more accessible for many peo-

p

See id.
150 See Mariani, supra note 167, at 13.
151 See id.
18 See id.
183 See id. at 15. Psychotherapy is provided in many different ways and settings. See

id. Sometimes, work is done at "residential or inpatient facilities," which include: residential treatment centers, psychiatric hospitals, and psychiatric wards of general hospi-

tals. See id. Some other therapists provide treatment for clients who are not hospitalized,
sometimes referred to as "outpatients."

See id.

Some of the different organizations that

provide outpatient therapy are college and university counseling centers, social service
agencies, day-treatment hospitals, health maintenance organizations, other managed care
providers, community mental health clinics, employee assistance programs, and other
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which of these settings and to which of these different therapists will the
privilege be applied? Will the privilege be extended only to clinical social workers? Or will all licensed social workers warrant the status of
the privilege?" 4
Furthermore, in today's society the biggest threat to confidential information conveyed between a patient and therapist may not even be from
the courts. It may in fact come from the "medical marketplace," where
in many instances managed care plans and insurance companies demand
information to warrant payment for this therapy. 18 5 Although some information may be warranted to avoid unnecessary spending, in many instances these companies are requiring therapists' notes. 18 6 Will such information be subject to the privilege in these instances?
The Court also failed to identify whether any of the traditional exruling.18 7
ceptions to the confidentiality rule will stand in light of its
These exceptions are necessary, yet the Court failed to address them.
Although the adoption of the privilege by the Court was warranted, and
may have been necessary, the lack of definition creates uncertainty as to
exactly what information may be privileged. And, as Justice Stevens
]n uncertain privilege, or
stated in the last line of the Court's opinion: "[a

human service agencies. See id. In addition, many therapists are private practitioners.
See id. Some psychotherapists even treat patients in multiple settings. See id. For example, some hold jobs within a mental health organization, while simultaneously conducting a private practice. See id.
S4 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (1996). The Jaffee Court
extended

the privilege to "confidential communications made to licensed social workers in the
course of psychotherapy." Id. The social worker in question, Karen Beyer, was a licensed clinical social worker of the State of Illinois. See id.at 1926. The Court failed to
address the question of whether there was a difference between all "licensed social workers" or "licensed clinical social workers," nor did the Court address the question of
whether that difference would be relevant. See id. at 1931.
195 See Trafford, supra note 166, at Z06.
196

See id.

Many psychotherapy counselors believe that these demands are "out of

bounds." See id.
157

See id. There are many well-known exceptions to a therapist's confidentiality. See

id. For example, therapists are mandated under certain state laws to report evidence of
the abuse of a child, and in other states therapists must also report to the authorities their
knowledge of instances of elder abuse. See id.; see also Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 441 (1976) (finding that "[t]here is no privilege... if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional
condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or property of another and that
disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened danger"). The

American Psychiatric Association's guidelines state that "[a]t times, psychiatrists' duties
regarding confidentiality come into conflict with their other professional responsibilities.
In cases involving imminent danger to others, psychiatrists must balance their duty to
protect these patients' confidences against their responsibility to the members of the public at risk." Trafford, supra note 166, at Z06.
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one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all." I
W. Joseph Nielsen

188 Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
393 (1981)).

